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Abstract
In the traditional approach to consumer behaviour it is assumed that
households behave as if they were single decision-making units. This ap-
proach has methodological, empirical and welfare economic deficiencies. A
valuable alternative to the traditional model is the collective approach to
household behaviour. The collective approach explicitly takes account of
the fact that multi-person households consist of several members which
may have different preferences. Among these household members, an in-
trahousehold bargaining process is assumed to take place. In addition to
providing an introduction to the collective approach, this survey intends to
show how different collective household models, each with their own aims
and assumptions, are connected.
Key words: collective household models, household bargaining, intra-
household allocation, consumption behaviour, labour supply.
1. Introduction
In his Foundations of Economic Analysis, Samuelson begins the chapter dealing
with the basic theory of consumer behaviour with the following assertion: “If
one were looking for a single criterion by which to distinguish modern economic
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theory from its classical precursors, he would probably decide that this is to be
found in the introduction of the so-called subjective theory of value into economic
theory” (Samuelson, 1947, p. 90). Indeed, one of the cornerstones of traditional
microeconomic theory is the assumption that an individual’s desires and tastes
are captured by her own rational preferences that determine her behaviour. It is
usually assumed that preferences, in turn, can be represented by a fixed utility
function. The consumer’s choice problem can thus be reduced to the maximiza-
tion of this utility function, subject to her budget constraint that defines the set
of alternatives between which she can choose. This particular set-up leads to
the well-known restrictions of adding-up, homogeneity, symmetry and negative
semidefiniteness of the Slutsky matrix on demand functions, which can be tested
by means of observable consumption and labour supply. Conversely, demand that
satisfies these theoretical restrictions can be shown to be integrable to a rational
preference ordering.
As to a definition of this ‘consumer’, traditional microeconomics remains rather
obscure. State of the art references of consumer theory like Deaton and Muell-
bauer (1980) and Barten and Bo¨hm (1982) treat ‘households’ and ‘consumers’ all
alike, or pay no attention to a precise definition. The same applies to most empir-
ical applications with regard to household consumption or labour supply, where
single individual households are lumped together with households consisting of
several members (see Blundell and Walker, 1986, Browning and Meghir, 1991,
Banks et alii, 1997 and Blundell and Robin, 2000, for some recent examples).
Implicitly, the traditional approach assumes that a household, even if it con-
sists of different individuals, acts as a single decision-making unit. Consequently,
household consumption and labour supply are considered to be the observable
result of the maximization of (fixed) household preferences, constrained by a
household budget restriction. This will hereafter be referred to as the unitary
model.
This unitary model, however, is increasingly coming under fire. It is attacked
by methodological, empirical and welfare economic arguments. Methodologically,
one can argue that the notion of subjective preferences is inseparable frommethod-
ological individualism, which asserts that social theories should run in terms of
the behaviour of individuals (see, e.g., Blaug, 1980). This would plead for an
approach that explicitly takes into account the notion that a household is a group
of individuals, with different preferences, and among whom an intrahousehold
decision-making process takes place. Of course, as long as household preferences
coincide with those of one individual, it all goes beautifully for the unitary model,
which assumes that households act as a single decision-maker. A distinction be-
tween individual preferences and household preferences then becomes somewhat
irrelevant to model household behaviour. Historically, there is perhaps something
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to say for this. Early contributors to the theory of consumption behaviour, e.g.,
use words like ‘consumer’, ‘household manager’ or ‘household leader’ throughout
their treatises on an equal basis (Kauder, 1965). This seems to suggest that house-
hold preferences used to coincide with those of a specific household member.1But
the moment this changes, the problem gets more complicated.
In fact, a household can be seen as a microsociety that consists of several
individuals with their own rational preferences. Observed household consumption
and labour supply can in this sense be considered as the social state chosen by
the household members. Referring to Arrow’s impossibility theorem, however, an
aggregate of individuals does not necessarily behave as a single individual with
her own rational preferences. Accordingly, it can be argued that the unitary
model acts as an empirical strait-jacket for observable household consumption
and labour supply. A first restriction of the unitary model is that individual
nonlabour incomes of the household members are pooled in a single household
nonlabour income. This ‘income pooling hypothesis’ implies that the source of
this exogenous income does not play any role in the household’s allocation with
regard to labour supply and consumption. Not surprisingly, this restriction has
been strongly rejected in numerous empirical studies (see, e.g., Thomas, 1990,
Bourguignon et alii, 1993, Browning et alii, 1994, Lundberg et alii, 1997 and Fortin
and Lacroix, 1997). A second empirical drawback touches upon the symmetry
of the Slutsky matrix. This boils down to, e.g., the requirement that marginal
compensated wage changes of two individuals in a household have the same effect
on each other’s labour supply. This theoretical restriction is also empirically
rejected (see, among many others, Fortin and Lacroix, 1997 and Browning and
Chiappori, 1998). Finally, when an individual is not participating in the labour
market (i.e., is at a corner solution), then it is the reservation wage, rather than
the market wage, of that individual that affects the labour supply decision of
another household member. This assumption seems to be far from innocuous
(Blundell et alii, 1998 and Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
Somewhat distanced from the positive modelling of household behaviour, is
the normative welfare analysis. Here too, the unitary model embraces some,
perhaps unexpected, difficulties. Without very strong assumptions, the unitary
model leaves no room to determine the intrahousehold allocation of consumption
and labour supply, and consequently, of welfare. Traditional welfare economic
models (e.g., on optimal taxation) only consider the distribution of welfare over
households. Either this implies that the welfare of individuals within a household
is unimportant, or that the intrahousehold distribution is optimal for the policy
maker (see, e.g., Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1994). Apps and Rees (1988) and
Brett (1998) have shown, however, that when evaluating the welfare effects of
tax changes, intrahousehold distributional effects cannot, in general, be ignored.
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Moreover, taking the distribution of welfare within a household into account may
drastically change the level of poverty or inequality (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990).
Alderman et alii (1995) argue that acceptance of the unitary model, when it is
inappropriate, has more serious consequences for policy prescriptions than reject-
ing the unitary model when it is appropriate. Knowledge of the intrahousehold
decision process may be important, especially in programs that target individuals
in certain groups (e.g., women or children). For some other studies that focus
on the implications of using unitary models for welfare economic problems, see
Lundberg and Pollak (1996), Phipps and Burton (1996) and Strauss et alii (2000).
Early attempts that account for the fact that households may consist of differ-
ent individuals with their own preferences are Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1974a,
1974b). Samuelson (1956) imposes such a structure on the household decision-
making problem that the household utility function collapses to a unitary one.
His solution amounts to the assumption of a weakly separable household utility
function, with the individuals’ utility functions as subutility functions. The form
of this aggregation function would be achieved by consensus among the individ-
uals.2By making use of this argument, one can of course also assume that the
household members decide to behave like some imaginary single individual with
rational preferences, without having recourse to weakly separable preferences.
Becker’s (1974a, 1974b) approach is closely related to Samuelson’s. But instead
of assuming that household members agree to behave as an imaginary individual,
he resorts to a benevolent head of the family, who takes into account the prefer-
ences of all household members. Again this concurs with weakly separable rational
household preferences. Two important remarks should be made with regard to
these approaches. Firstly, one may argue that Arrow’s impossibility theorem pops
up once again, if household members are trying to reach some rational consensus
household model. Secondly, both approaches again put household consumption
and labour supply in the strait-jacket of the unitary model that is too restrictive.
Two more fruitful approaches that explicitly take into account several decision-
makers in a household, make use of game theoretic elements. The first of these
approaches models household behaviour in a non-cooperative framework (see, e.g.,
Leuthold, 1968, Ashworth and Ulph, 1981, Browning, 2000 and Chen andWoolley,
2001). In these models, household members are assumed to maximize their utility,
taking the other individuals’ behaviour as given. In general, this Nash equilib-
rium setting implies other restrictions on observable household behaviour than
the unitary approach. One potential drawback of these non-cooperative models,
however, is that they do not necessarily result in Pareto efficient intrahousehold
allocations. That is, in many cases, it is possible to make an individual better off,
without making the other household members worse off. The second approach is
that of, e.g., Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). They
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incorporate in a household model elements of cooperative game theory, and more
specifically of axiomatic bargaining theory. Household members are the agents
that try to come to an agreement on how to divide the gains of cooperation; in
this case, the gains of living together. Depending on the bargaining power of the
household members, a specific Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocation of wel-
fare is obtained. Manser and Brown (1980) derive the implications on demand
for bargaining concepts like the dictatorial, the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. McElroy and Horney (1981), on the other hand, focus on the Nash bar-
gaining solution and derive conditions for a Nash demand system to collapse to a
traditional unitary model.
An important criticism of the approach of choosing a particular bargaining
concept to model household behaviour, is that if its empirical implications are
rejected, then it is impossible to determine whether the particular choice itself is
rejected or the bargaining setting in general, as opposed to the unitary model.
Therefore, Chiappori (1988a, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988) take an alternative
starting point. The only assumption they make, is that intrahousehold decisions
are Pareto efficient. Thus contrary to, e.g., Manser and Brown (1980), no restric-
tion is imposed a priori on which point on the Pareto frontier will be chosen by the
household. Even this weak restriction makes it possible to derive some testable
implications of the model and to identify an important part of the intrahouse-
hold decision-making process and individual preferences. We will hereafter refer
to this as the collective approach to household behaviour. It can be shown that
this collective model leads to household preferences that are dependent on wages,
prices and individual nonlabour incomes. The presence of the latter in the house-
hold’s preferences reflects the fact that the distribution of the bargaining power
within a household may depend on the level of each of these variables. What is
important in light of the empirical deficiencies of the unitary model, is that this
collective approach is able to raise these. The income pooling hypothesis, e.g.,
no longer needs to be satisfied. The same goes for a collective generalization of
Slutsky symmetry.
Gradually, the collective approach has found acceptance in recent microeco-
nomic theory. While Chiappori (1988a, 1992) initially concentrated on labour
supply behaviour in a cross-sectional context, the approach has been extended in
several directions. Browning et alii (1994), e.g., derived a collective model to de-
scribe household consumption on cross-sections. Browning and Chiappori (1998),
on the other hand, consider an environment of relative price variation for a num-
ber of commodities. In Chiappori (1997), household production is introduced in
a collective model of labour supply. Due to the multitude of collective house-
hold models, it is sometimes difficult to see the wood for the trees. In addition
to providing a more thorough introduction to collective household models, this
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survey intends to show how the different models, each with their own aims and
assumptions, are connected. Starting from Browning and Chiappori’s (1998) gen-
eral model, it is shown that many collective household models are special cases of
the latter.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basic concepts of the
collective approach to household behaviour. Central in this discussion is the gen-
eral collective household model of Browning and Chiappori (1998). In Section 3,
attention is focused on several collective models that are nested within the gen-
eral model. Both specific labour supply and consumption models are discussed.
The fourth section contains a superficial discussion on the alternative approach of
choosing particular bargaining concepts to model household behaviour. For the
sake of completeness, Section 5 devotes some attention to non-cooperative models
of household behaviour. Section 6 concludes.
2. The collective approach to household behaviour: a gen-
eral model
As already mentioned in the introduction, this section focuses on the general
collective household model of Browning and Chiappori (1998). Although this
model could include leisure (as the complement of labour supply), this was not
made explicit in their paper. To be able to place the specific collective models of
the next section, we will slightly extend the Browning and Chiappori model to
include leisure. Before the collective approach is reviewed, however, we will start
with the traditional unitary model. This will allow for both an introduction of
some core notation and a discussion of the deficiencies of the unitary model.
2.1. The unitary model as an introduction to collective household mod-
els
The standard theory of consumer behaviour is an example par excellence of the
economic problem: households have needs and desires that they want to satisfy.
But they have to make choices, since they are limited in their possibilities. A
fundamental assumption of the unitary approach to household behaviour is that
a household’s needs and desires are fully captured by a rational preference ordering
over alternative consumption and leisure bundles.3These preferences are usually
assumed to be representable by an, up to a monotone increasing transformation,
unique well-behaved utility function. Formally, the utility function for a household
consisting of two working-age individuals A and B equals:
u = v
³
q, qA0 , q
B
0
´
,
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where v is a strongly quasi-concave, increasing and twice continuously differen-
tiable function in its arguments. These are the household’s consumption vector
q = (q1, ..., qn)
0 ∈ IRn+, and the individuals’ leisure amounts qA0 and qB0 , both
∈ IR+. Household resources, however, are limited. The full budget constraint of
the two-person household equals:
p0q+ wAqA0 + w
BqB0 ≤ yA + yB + yH + wAT + wBT,
where p =(p1, ..., pn)
0 ∈ IRn++ is the price vector, wI ∈ IR++ is the wage rate of
household member I (I = A,B), yI ∈ IR+ is the personal nonlabour income of I
(I = A,B), yH is the households’ nonlabour income that cannot be assigned to
one of its members and T is the time endowment. The household’s choice problem
can now be reduced to the following maximization problem:
maxeq v (eq) ,
subject to ep0eq ≤ yS + wAT + wBT,
where eq = ³q0, qA0 , qB0 ´0 denotes the household consumption and leisure bundle,ep = ³p0, wA, wB´0, the ‘full’ price vector, and yS = yA+yB+yH the aggregate non-
labour income. This maximization problem results in a set of n+2 differentiable
Marshallian commodity and leisure demand functions:
eq = g ³yS + wAT + wBT, ep´ . (2.1)
These demand functions have the following well-known properties:
adding up: ep0g ³yS + wAT + wBT, ep´ = yS + wAT + wBT
homogeneity: g
³
θ
³
yS + wAT + wBT
´
, θep´ = g ³yS + wAT + wBT, ep´, θ ∈
IR++
Slutsky symmetry: S = S0, where S = ∂g
∂ep0 + ∂g∂(yS+wAT+wBT ) eq0
negativity: ξ0Sξ ≤ 0, for all ξ ∈ IRn+2.4
The empirical testing of these restrictions went hand in hand with develop-
ments in consumer theory. Except for the natural adding up condition, each
of these restrictions were repeatedly rejected in various studies (see Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980 and Blundell, 1988 for some evidence and interpretation). The
successive rejections of the restrictions on demand in no way led to a falsification
of the standard theory of consumer behaviour. Many rejections were interpreted
as being due to data problems, inadequate functional forms or other specifica-
tion issues, rather than to the basic theory itself (see, e.g., Keuzenkamp and
7
Barten, 1995). Except for a few refinements (dynamic models with habit forma-
tion, incorporation of demographic effects in demand analysis, etc.), they did not
end up fundamentally changing the standard consumer theory.
Apart from the above theoretical restrictions on demand, the unitary model
implies the ‘income pooling hypothesis’. This asserts that the source of the non-
labour income does not play any role in the household’s allocation problem. It is
easily seen from equation (2.1) that marginal changes of the different nonlabour in-
comes have the same effect on demand, i.e. ∂g∂yA =
∂g
∂yB =
∂g
∂yH =
∂g
∂yS . This restric-
tion has also been rejected on numerous occasions (see Bourguignon et alii, 1993,
Browning et alii, 1994, Lundberg et alii, 1997 and Fortin and Lacroix, 1997, for
a few examples). Contrary to the statistical testing and rejection of the usual
restrictions of demand theory, it can perhaps be argued that rejections of the in-
come pooling hypothesis paved the way for a more fundamental reinterpretation
of consumer theory. The distinguishing characteristic of this reinterpretation is
the fact that households consist of several individuals, who may have different
preferences, and among whom an intrahousehold decision-making process takes
place.
2.2. A general collective household model
2.2.1. Preferences, commodities and the household budget constraint
In what follows, we will continue focusing on households consisting of two working-
age individuals A and B. Contrary to the unitary approach to household be-
haviour, each of these individuals is characterized by her or his own rational
preferences. Preferences are assumed to be very general, in that they are defined
over both one’s own consumption and leisure and the other individual’s consump-
tion and leisure. Thus, externalities in consumption or leisure are allowed. These
externalities can be positive or negative. There would be a positive externality
with regard to leisure, e.g., if both household members were to enjoy each other’s
company and spend their leisure time together. A negative externality, e.g., would
occur if one individual were to dislike the other individual’s consumption of to-
bacco. Further, there is no restriction on the character of the commodities in the
consumption vector. Commodities can be consumed privately, publicly or both.
Soft drinks clearly have a private character, since for each bottle of coke consumed
by one individual, there is one bottle less for the other. Rent, e.g., is a public good.
Consumption of it by one individual does not affect the supply available for the
other household member, and (at least if one wants to maintain the household) no
individual can be excluded from consuming it. Other commodities can be both
privately or publicly consumed. If both household members like watching the
same television programmes, expenditures on pay TV are a public good. These
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(or some of these) expenditures would be a private good if only one household
member were to watch television.
Preferences of individual I (I = A,B) are assumed to be representable by the
following direct utility function:
uI = vI
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
, (2.2)
where vI is a twice continuously differentiable strongly concave utility function
with the consumption vectors qA =
³
qA1 , ..., q
A
n
´0
and qB =
³
qB1 , ..., q
B
n
´0
, both
∈ IRn+, the leisure amounts qA0 and qB0 , both ∈ IR+, and the vector of public con-
sumption Q =(Q1, ..., Qn)
0 ∈IRn+ as arguments. The utility function vI is assumed
to be strictly increasing in qI , qI0 and Q. Given that externalities can be positive
or negative, vI is not necessarily increasing in qJ and qJ0 , for J 6= I.
The full budget constraint of the household is:
p0
³
qA + qB +Q
´
+ wAqA0 + w
BqB0 ≤ yA + yB + yH +
³
wA + wB
´
T, (2.3)
where p, wA, wB, yA, yB and yH are defined as before. This budget constraint
thus captures all the household’s endowments, which are used to finance household
purchases of consumption and leisure.
2.2.2. Pareto efficient or collective household behaviour
Given that preferences are defined on an individualistic basis, nothing has been
said on household preferences thus far. In any case, household purchases are the
observable result of some intrahousehold decision-making process. This can take
a myriad of forms. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981),
e.g., follow an axiomatic bargaining approach and assume that households behave
as if they take decisions on the basis of particular bargaining rules like the Nash
or Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Other authors, on the contrary, suppose non-
cooperative household behaviour (see, e.g., Bourguignon, 1984, Kooreman and
Kapteyn, 1990, Browning, 2000 and Chen and Woolley, 2001).
Instead of focusing on a particular bargaining rule, Chiappori (1988a) and
Apps and Rees (1988) only assume that the household decision-making pro-
cess results in Pareto efficient outcomes. That is, chosen consumption bundles
and leisure are such that an individual’s welfare cannot be increased without
decreasing the welfare of the other household member. In Browning and Chi-
appori (1998), some arguments for this collective household approach are given.
Firstly, in the particular context of a repeated game and under the assumption of
perfect information on each other’s preferences, it is plausible that the household
members could develop Pareto efficient allocation mechanisms. Secondly, one can
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argue that the assumption of Pareto efficiency is the most natural generalization
of the assumption of utility maximization in the unitary model with several house-
hold members. What is important here, is that the latter is a particular outcome of
the collective household approach. And finally, many widespread bargaining rules
generally assume Pareto efficiency. Examples are the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky,
utilitarian and egalitarian solutions (see, e.g., Thomson, 1994).
By making use of standard instruments of welfare economics, we can eas-
ily describe the collective household model. A bundle
³
qA0,qB0, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
0
´0
is a
Pareto optimal allocation of consumption and leisure within the household if it is
a solution to the following maximization problem:
max
qA,qB ,qA0 ,q
B
0 ,Q
vA
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
subject to
(1) vB
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
≥ uB (2.4)
(2) p0q+ wAqA0 + w
BqB0 ≤ yS +
³
wA + wB
´
T,
where uB is some required utility level for individual B, yS = yA + yB + yH and
q = qA + qB + Q. Thus, the maximization problem (2.4) seeks an allocation
that maximizes individual A’s welfare, subject to some preallocated welfare level
for household member B and to the household budget constraint. By varying
uB, all Pareto efficient allocations can be traced out. This set of Pareto efficient
allocations forms the boundary of the utility possibility set, which captures all
attainable vectors of utility levels for the household. Given that it is assumed
that the individual utility functions are strongly concave and that the budget
constraint defines a convex set, the utility possibility set is strictly convex. This
is an important result, because it allows to characterize all Pareto efficient allo-
cations as stationary points of a linear ‘social welfare function’ (more specifically,
of a nonsymmetric utilitarian social welfare function) for some positive welfare
weights for both individuals (see Dorfman, 1975, Panzar and Willig, 1976 and
Mas-Colell et alii, 1995). That is, the household allocation problem (2.4) can be
defined as the unique solution to the following maximization problem:
max
qA,qB ,qA0 ,q
B
0 ,Q
µ (p,w,y) vA
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
+[1− µ (p,w,y)] vB
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
(2.5)
subject to
p0q+ wAqA0 + w
BqB0 ≤ yS +
³
wA + wB
´
T,
where w =
³
wA, wB
´0
and y =
³
yA, yB, yH
´0
.5
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In this social welfare context, welfare weights µ (p,w,y) and [1− µ (p,w,y)]
are attached to both household members. In general, these (normalized) La-
grangian multipliers of the maximization problem (2.4) will depend on the exoge-
nous variables p, w and y. An interpretation of these welfare weights is that they
represent the bargaining power of the household members in the intrahousehold
allocation process. Changes in wages, nonlabour incomes or prices, may then
shift bargaining power from one individual to the other. This, in turn, has con-
sequences on observable household consumption and labour supply. A change in
the nonlabour income of a household member, e.g., may not only affect household
consumption and labour supply via the usual income effect, but also by means of
a shift in bargaining power. Since changes in individual nonlabour incomes alter
the bargaining position of the household members, the source of the nonlabour
income may be important for the household allocation. This is an important
implication of the collective household approach, since it no longer implies the
income pooling hypothesis.
The same applies for changes in wages or prices. Apart from the usual substitu-
tion and income effects, shifts in the bargaining power of the household members
can also be expected. These may invoke some additional effects on household
consumption and labour supply. More specifically, household preferences, as cap-
tured by the linear social welfare function (2.5), thus depend on prices, wages
and nonlabour incomes. Such preferences are a generalization of Kalman’s (1968)
and Pollak’s (1977) price dependent preferences. They have shown that the usual
‘Slutsky effects’, defined as the sum of the ‘standard’ uncompensated price effect
and the ‘standard’ income effect, are no longer symmetric.6 Moreover, the ma-
trix consisting of these ‘Slutsky effects’ is not necessarily negative semidefinite.
These are again very important and distinguishing implications of the collective
household model.
Before we elaborate on this point, it is perhaps useful to give some intuition for
it. Household preferences, as represented by the social welfare function (2.5), may
be interpreted as being a sort of weighted average of individual preferences. Since
the individuals’ weights may alter following changes in the wages, prices or non-
labour incomes, household preferences are no longer constant in the normal sense.
The probability of still obtaining a rational, i.e. complete and transitive, house-
hold preference ordering, is limited. Consequently, one cannot expect household
consumption and labour supply to remain subject to the standard restrictions
on demand, which are direct consequences of rational preference orderings in the
unitary approach.
Given that the collective approach to household behaviour does not assume the
existence of rational household preferences, is it possible at all to derive testable
restrictions on the collective household model? Or can any observable house-
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hold behaviour be placed in the rather loose jacket of the collective framework?
Another important question is whether the collective approach makes it possi-
ble to draw any conclusions on the intrahousehold decision-making process and
on individual preferences. It is well-known that in the unitary model, demand
that satisfies the restrictions of adding up, homogeneity, symmetry and negative
semidefiniteness of the Slutsky matrix is integrable to a rational preference order-
ing. This is quite a useful result, if one wants to evaluate changes in the economic
environment on the welfare of households. Both questions and, of course, an-
swers, will pop up here and there in the remainder of this paper. But first, it is
demonstrated that the unitary model can be seen as a special case of the collective
household model.
2.2.3. The unitary model as a special case of the general model
Under what circumstances does the collective household model, as defined by
equation (2.5), reduce to the unitary model? Three possibilities can be distin-
guished.
A first possibility lies perhaps closest to the consumption theory that early
contributors had in mind: household preferences are those of the ‘household plan-
ner’ or the ‘household leader’ (see, e.g., Kauder, 1965). This dictatorial solution is
obtained if individual A’s welfare weight µ (p,w,y) is fixed at either 1 or 0. In the
first case, A would be the dictator; in the latter case, household member B. Note
that this dictator can be a benevolent one, who positively values the consumption
and leisure bundle of the other household member. In this case, the dictator’s
utility function vI
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
(I = A or B) would be increasing in all its
arguments (i.e., there would only be positive externalities). A special form of such
utility function would occur if the benevolent dictator were nonpaternalistic in the
sense that he only valued the welfare of the other household member, rather than
the specific consumption and leisure bundle preferred by this individual. The
utility function of this Beckerian (1974a, 1974b) benevolent head of the family is
of the form f I
³
vA
³
qA, qA0 ,Q
´
, vB
³
qB, qB0 ,Q
´´
(I = A or B), where f I is some
increasing function in its arguments.
A second possibility is when the welfare weights of the individuals are fixed
somewhere between 0 and 1. In this case, the household utility function equals
µvA
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
+ (1− µ) vB
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
, with µ ∈ ]0, 1[. Depend-
ing on the arguments in the individual utility functions, this possibility has some
interesting specifications. If each individual utility function has at least one good
(or leisure amount) as an exclusive argument, then the household behaves as if
it were a single individual with latently separable preferences (see Blundell and
Robin, 2000).7If there are no externalities in consumption and leisure and no pub-
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lic consumption, then one obtains strongly separable household preferences that
are closely connected to the rational preferences of Samuelson’s (1956) imaginary
individual.
Finally, the collective household model collapses to the unitary model if both
household members have the same preferences over consumption and leisure bun-
dles. In this case, the household utility function equals the common utility function
of both individuals.
As was already stressed, observable household demand that is compatible with
the unitary model satisfies the usual theoretical restrictions and the income pool-
ing hypothesis. On the other hand, demand that stems from the collective house-
hold model is not put in such a strait-jacket. In the next paragraph, it is shown
that even the loose framework of the collective approach implies an important
restriction that is testable on observable household demand.
2.2.4. A generalization of Slutsky symmetry
To reach a testable implication of the collective household model, we will put some
more structure into the household utility function (2.5). More specifically, it will be
assumed that the function µ (p,w,y) is continuously differentiable and homoge-
neous of degree zero in its arguments. This will guarantee that the unique solution
to the maximization of the household utility function, subject to the budget con-
straint, will be a set of demand functions that are continuously differentiable and
homogeneous of degree zero. Note that this assumption implies the usual absence
of money illusion: the unit in which prices, wages and income are expressed does
not affect the household allocation process. A second assumption is that only
total household consumption is observable (apart from the observable individual
leisure amounts qA0 and q
B
0 ). That is, we can only observe q = q
A + qB +Q and
not the individual components of q. This is a very useful generalization, since
most household budget surveys do not allow to distinguish the final consumer of
the greater part of the household consumption bundle.
Let us again use the notation associated with the unitary model. The house-
hold consumption and leisure bundle is denoted by eq = ³q0, qA0 , qB0 ´0, while the
price vector, augmented with the two wages, is denoted by ep = ³p0, wA, wB´0. The
(Pareto efficient) solution of the household allocation problem (2.5) now equals
the following set of n+ 2 demand equations:
eq = g ³yS + wAT + wBT, ep´ , (2.6)
where for all commodities in the vector eq, eqi = qAi + qBi + Qi. Moreover, given
the assumptions we made, these demand functions are continuously differentiable,
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homogeneous of degree zero and add up to full income yS+wAT+wBT . By means
of these observable demand functions, we can again define a ‘Slutsky’ matrix:
S =
∂g
∂ep0 + ∂g∂ (yS + wAT + wBT ) eq0. (2.7)
Following Browning and Chiappori (1998), we call this the pseudo-Slutsky matrix.
The reason for this change of name is that the elements of S can no longer be
considered as the price effects on demand with the household utility level held
constant. In the unitary model, Slutsky effects capture the move along an in-
difference surface due to a marginal price or wage change. The pseudo-Slutsky
effects as defined in equation (2.7), however, not only encompass the move along
an indifference surface, but also a move of the indifference surface itself.
This is easily seen, if we look at the main result of Browning and Chiap-
pori (1998). They showed that household demand, which is compatible with the
collective household model, satisfies the following restriction:
S = Σ+ uv0, (2.8)
where Σ is a symmetric negative semidefinite matrix and u and v are two (n+ 2)
vectors. Note that the matrix R = uv0 has at most rank 1.
This result can be interpreted as follows. The pseudo-Slutsky effect sij =
∂gi
∂pj
+ ∂gi∂(yS+wAT+wBT )qj is the effect on commodity i of a marginal increase in the
price of commodity j, whereby the household is compensated by an increase in
the full income. Browning and Chiappori’s “symmetry + rank 1” (SR1) condition
shows that these pseudo-Slutsky effects can be decomposed into two parts: a
pure substitution effect and an extra price effect. The pure substitution effect
corresponds to the usual compensated (Slutsky) price and wage effects, whereby
the household utility and the welfare weights µ and (1− µ) are held constant (i.e.,
the move along an indifference curve). The extra price effect, in turn, comes from
the change in bargaining power functions µ and (1− µ) as a consequence of the
marginal price change (i.e., the move of the indifference curve). Note that in the
unitary model, this latter effect equals zero (R = 0). In this case, the pseudo-
Slutsky matrix S reduces to the usual Slutsky matrix Σ that is symmetric and
negative semidefinite. Browning and Chiappori (1998) also showed that to test
the SR1 condition, one needs at least five commodities, leisure amounts included.
This is quite an important restriction, since it rules out testing the SR1 property
on datasets that only contain labour supply information (i.e., hours and wages
of the two household members), and no information on how expenditures are
allocated to different goods and services with price variation.
Browning and Chiappori (1998) put data on Canadian childless households to
the SR1 test. Their main results are that the unitary model could not be rejected
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for singles, while it could be rejected for couples. The SR1 property, on the other
hand, could not be rejected for couples. Observed household behaviour thus seems
to be consistent with the collective household model on the basis of this dataset.
2.2.5. Expanding the general model with distribution factors
Earlier, it was stressed that the household utility function’s welfare weights µ and
(1− µ), which represent the bargaining power of the household members, may de-
pend on prices, wages and nonlabour incomes. In the derivation of Browning and
Chiappori’s (1998) SR1 property, e.g., prices and wages played an explicit role in
the household allocation process. However, other factors may also affect this allo-
cation process. The most obvious examples are the individual nonlabour incomes
yA and yB. An increase in an individual’s nonlabour income may shift bargaining
power from one individual to the other, which has consequences on the allocation
of household consumption and labour supply. Less obvious, but not necessarily
less important are the so-called extrahousehold environmental parameters (see
McElroy, 1990). Examples are laws on alimony and child benefits, tax laws that
differ according to marital status and divorce law. Changes in these variables
may affect outside opportunities of the household members and may thus have
consequences on their bargaining power. Following Bourguignon, Browning and
Chiappori (1994), such factors can be termed distribution factors. More precisely,
distribution factors are defined as variables that affect the bargaining power func-
tion µ, but that do not have any direct influence on the individuals’ preferences
and the household budget constraint. Individual nonlabour incomes, e.g., may be
assumed to affect the bargaining power of the household members, but not their
preferences. Moreover, the effect on the budget constraint runs through a change
in total household nonlabour income. Even laws on alimony or divorce laws do
not have such an indirect effect on the household budget constraint.
An interesting additional test of the general collective household model can
be derived if there is only one distribution factor z.8In this case, Browning and
Chiappori (1998) showed that the pseudo-Slutsky matrix takes the form:
S = Σ+
∂g
∂z
v0, (2.9)
where Σ is again a symmetric negative semidefinite matrix and v an (n+ 2)
vector. The change in demand due to a marginal change in the distribution
factor z is thus directly related to the pseudo-Slutsky matrix S and the usual
Slutsky matrix Σ. Such a result would be quite remarkable outside the collective
household framework, but easily explainable within.
If there is a vector of distribution factors z =(z1, ..., zm)
0, another result can be
proven, providing an extra test of the collective household model (see Bourguignon
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et alii, 1993). Demand compatible with the collective household model must
satisfy the following proportionality result:
∂g
∂zi
= θi
∂g
∂z1
, for all i ≥ 2 and θi ∈ IR. (2.10)
Both tests (2.9) and (2.10) were applied by Browning and Chiappori (1998).
After a careful selection of distribution factors (concretely, variables that did not
affect the demand of singles), they could not reject the collective household model.
Together with the results of the SR1 test, these results give rather strong evidence
in favour of the collective approach to household behaviour.
3. Restrictions on the general collective household model
In the former section, we considered a very general collective household model.
There were no restrictions on individual preferences. Both externalities and public
goods were allowed to enter the individual utility functions. Moreover, almost all
testable implications of the general model were defined in a context with explicit
price variation (cf. the SR1 property). In this section, we will restrict the general
collective household model in several ways. Firstly, individual preferences can be
restricted in some useful directions. As will be shown further on, this will allow
for a nice interpretation of the collective approach. These restrictions will also
permit to derive some important identification results on individual preferences
and the intrahousehold allocation process. Apart from restrictions on preferences,
available datasets may bring about additional restrictions on the general model.
Many household labour supply datasets, e.g., do not contain information on the
allocation of total expenditures to different consumption goods. Household budget
surveys, on the other hand, do not always capture individual wages or hours
worked. This section discusses some collective household models that arise from
these particular restrictions.
3.1. Restrictions on preferences: the sharing rule result
3.1.1. Egoistic and caring preferences
Up to now, individual preferences were assumed to be representable by the utility
function vI
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
, for I = A,B. Both positive and negative exter-
nalities in consumption and leisure could occur. There was also room for public
goods in the household allocation problem. We will now restrict these general
preferences somewhat. Two particularly useful types of preferences are egoistic
and caring preferences.
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Household members have egoistic preferences if their preferences only depend
on own consumption and own leisure. This amounts to preferences that can be
represented by a utility function of the form:
uI = vI
³
qI , qI0
´
, I = A,B.
In this case, household members derive utility only from own consumption and
leisure. Changes in the commodity bundle of the other household member do not
have any effect on one’s own welfare.
Beckerian caring preferences (Becker, 1974a, 1974b) are a generalization of
these rather restrictive egoistic preferences. This type of preferences can be rep-
resented by utility functions of the form:
uI = f I
³
vA
³
qA, qA0
´
, vB
³
qB, qB0
´´
, I = A,B,
where f I is some increasing function in its arguments. Caring preferences thus
boil down to household members who positively value increases in the welfare of
the others, but who are not primarily interested in how this welfare is obtained.
3.1.2. The sharing rule result
Both egoistic and caring preferences make a nice interpretation of the collective
household model possible. If preferences are egoistic or caring, then the Pareto
efficient household allocation program (2.5) can be shown to be equivalent to the
existence of a function φ (p,w,y) such that the individuals’ leisure amounts qA0
and qB0 and consumption bundles q
A and qB, with q = qA + qB, are solutions to
the maximization programs (I = A,B):
max
qI ,qI0
vI
³
qI , qI0
´
, (3.1)
subject to
p0qI + wIqI0 ≤ φI (p,w,y) + wIT,
where φA (p,w,y) = φ (p,w,y) and φB (p,w,y) = yS − φ (p,w,y).9Under the
given assumptions, the household allocation problem is reduced to a sort of two-
stage budgeting process. Firstly, both household members divide total household
nonlabour income yS among each other according to the sharing rule φ, which
in general depends on exogenous prices, wages and nonlabour incomes. In the
second stage, the individuals independently allocate their share of full income to
own consumption and leisure in a way that maximizes their individual welfare.
This sharing rule interpretation of Pareto efficient household behaviour is nothing
more than an application of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
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The Pareto optimal allocation
³
qA0,qB0, qA0 , q
B
0
´0
can in this sense be considered
as a competitive market equilibrium with lump-sum transfers between household
members (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et alii, 1995).10
This sharing rule result will prove useful in the identification of individual
preferences and the intrahousehold allocation process. To illustrate this, we will
focus attention on household labour supply models.
3.2. Collective labour supply models
3.2.1. Collective labour supply with observable distribution factors
Many datasets that contain labour supply data (wages and hours worked) do not
embrace information on the household consumption bundle under different price
regimes. The only ‘price’ variation in most cross-sections with microdata is the
wage variation between individuals. Of course, one must cut one’s coat according
to one’s cloth, if one wants to apply standard microeconomic theory to labour
supply behaviour. This cloth is not even that poor a quality. Since it is assumed
that there is no relative price variation for consumption goods in cross-sections,
one can safely resort to Hicks’ composite commodity theorem. This theorem as-
serts that if a group of prices move in parallel, then the corresponding group of
consumption goods can be treated as a single commodity; the so-called Hicksian
aggregate commodity (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). More specifically, the
theorem implies that, under the given condition, a new preference ordering can be
defined over a Hicksian aggregate commodity (in this case, total expenditures on
consumption goods) and leisure that leads to the same consumption and leisure
bundle as the original preference ordering.11This way out has important conse-
quences on the testability of the collective model by means of the pseudo-Slutsky
matrix. As proven by Browning and Chiappori (1998), the SR1 property can
only be tested if there are at least five commodities (cf. supra). We have only
three different commodities (two leisure amounts and one observable Hicksian
aggregate commodity), which renders the SR1 property untestable in the given
context. However, the particular set-up we will focus on allows to derive other
testable restrictions. Moreover, this set-up implies some important identification
results.
In what follows, we will assume that there are only two sources of relative price
variation. These are the wages of both household members. A second assumption
is that individual preferences are egoistic.12The set-up is fully defined with the
third assumption of at least one observable distribution factor z that differs from
individual nonlabour incomes (i.e., a variable that affects the bargaining power of
the household members, but which has no direct influence on their preferences and
the household budget constraint). In this setting, the general collective household
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allocation problem (2.5) reduces to the following maximization problem:
max
cA,cB ,qA0 ,q
B
0
µ (w,y, z) vA
³
cA, qA0
´
+ [1− µ (w,y,z)] vB
³
cB, qB0
´
(3.2)
subject to
cA + cB + wAqA0 + w
BqB0 ≤ yS +
³
wA + wB
´
T,
where cI is member I’s unobserved consumption of the Hicksian aggregate com-
modity (I = A,B) and z is the distribution factor that only affects the functions
µ and (1− µ). Note that, without losing generality, the price of the Hicksian
commodity has been set equal to 1. Under the usual regularity conditions, the so-
lution to this maximization problem is the set of differentiable Marshallian labour
supply equations (with `I = T − qI0 for I = A,B):
`I = hI
³
yS,w, z
´
, (3.3)
which are dependent on nonlabour income, wages and the distribution factor.
Since preferences are assumed to be egoistic, the observed labour supplies `A and
`B can be considered as derived from the maximization programs (3.1), redefined
in a cross-section context and completed with the distribution factor z. Conse-
quently, labour supply equations can be written as follows:
`A = lA
³
φ (w,y, z) , wA
´
, (3.4)
`B = lB
³
yS − φ (w,y, z) , wB
´
,
where the sharing rule φ, that defines the intrahousehold allocation process, is
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable.
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (forthcoming) proved that this set-up implies
testable restrictions of the collective model on observed labour supply behaviour.
Instead of enumerating these restrictions, we will focus on the intuition behind the
derivation of these. The obtained results are entirely driven by the applicability of
the sharing rule result. Firstly, as is clear from equation (3.4), marginal changes
in the distribution factor z only affect individual labour supplies `A and `B via
the sharing rule φ. Secondly, a marginal change of a household member’s wage
has only an income effect on the other’s labour supply. This income effect runs
through the individuals’ shares of nonlabour income. Finally, marginal changes
in nonlabour incomes y =
³
yA, yB, yH
´0
have an indirect effect on labour supplies
via the shares of nonlabour income of both household members.13Taken together,
these results allow to derive the marginal rates of substitution, between each
couple of variables of the set
n
wA, wB, yA, yB, yH , z
o
, of the sharing rule φ in
terms of observable labour supplies `A and `B.14By means of this set of marginal
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substitution rates, the partial derivatives of the sharing rule φ (i.e., ∂φ∂wA ,
∂φ
∂wB ,
∂φ
∂yA ,
∂φ
∂yB ,
∂φ
∂yH ,
∂φ
∂z ) can be derived. In order to make this set of partial differential
equations integrable to φ, a set of cross-equation restrictions has to be satisfied³
e.g., ∂
³
∂φ
∂yA
´
/∂z = ∂
³
∂φ
∂z
´
/∂yA
´
. Since leisure qI0 = T−`I can also be considered
as resulting from the maximization of the individual utility function vI subject
to an individual budget constraint (cf. equation (3.1)), the usual integrability
conditions of symmetry and negativity of the associated Slutsky matrix have to
be satisfied.15
The main result of Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (forthcoming) now is, that if
all these conditions are satisfied, the sharing rule φ is identified up to an additive
constant. It can be shown that individual consumptions of the Hicksian aggregate
commodity cA and cB are also identified up to the same additive constant. More-
over, keeping in mind the sharing rule result, individual indirect utility functions
can also be defined, for a given additive constant, via observable labour supply
behaviour. As for the sharing rule, this implies that it will in general be impossible
to predict that, say, 60% of total household nonlabour income will be allocated
to individual A and 40% to individual B in a certain wage and nonlabour income
regime. On the other hand, the given set-up allows statements like “a one percent
increase of individual A’s wage will change his share in nonlabour income by x
percent”. These are important identification results, since next to a restriction on
individual preferences, only Pareto efficiency of household behaviour is assumed.
In particular, the collective approach allows to analyse the effects of policy re-
forms upon individual household members, both in terms of individual welfare
and in terms of derived individual consumption. Note that such identification
results will, in general, not exist in the unitary model. Consequently, with regard
to normative welfare analyses, the collective model has a decisive advantage over
the unitary one.
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (forthcoming) tested the above collective house-
hold model on a sample of couples where both spouses have a positive labour
supply. They considered the sex ratio, defined as the number of males over the
number of males and females for several sociological groups, and variables cap-
turing divorce legislation as distribution factors. The restrictions of the collective
model could not be rejected on the base of their results. As for the sharing rule,
they found a significant positive relationship between the sex ratio and the wife’s
share in nonlabour income. Also the passing of divorce laws that are favourable
to women significantly increases their share in nonlabour income.
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3.2.2. Collective labour supply without observable distribution factors
In what follows, we will put more information constraints on available data. Con-
trary to the previous section, we will assume that only individual wages of both
household members and total household nonlabour income are observed. This is
the set-up assumed by Chiappori (1988a, 1992) in his initial contributions to the
collective approach.
Under these assumptions, the general collective household model of equation
(2.5) reduces to the following maximization problem:
max
cA,cB ,qA0 ,q
B
0
µ
³
w, yS
´
vA
³
cA, qA0
´
+
h
1− µ
³
w, yS
´i
vB
³
cB, qB0
´
(3.5)
subject to
cA + cB + wAqA0 + w
BqB0 ≤ yS +
³
wA + wB
´
T,
where yS denotes observable total household nonlabour income. This maximiza-
tion problem will result in a set of labour supply functions, with nonlabour income
and wages as the only arguments. Given that egoistic (or caring) preferences are
assumed, the individual labour supply can again be written as a function of the
share in nonlabour income and the own wage rate.
The problem with this set-up without observable distribution factors, is that
the simple derivation of the partials of the sharing rule φ, in terms of first-order
derivatives of labour supply functions, is no longer possible. In Chiappori (1988a),
a set of testable restrictions of the collective approach on observable labour supply
is derived. These restrictions make use of second-order and third-order derivatives
of observable labour supply. Consequently, results may be less robust than those
derived in a context with observable distribution factors. If the restrictions are
satisfied, the sharing rule φ and individual consumption of the Hicksian aggregate
commodity cA and cB can be identified up to an additive constant. For a particu-
lar choice of this additive constant, the individual utility functions vA and vB are
uniquely defined. Again, these results are driven by the sharing rule result that is
applicable under egoistic and caring preferences. Chiappori (1988a) also derived
some restrictions on observed labour supply under the general individual pref-
erences vI
³
cA, cB, qA0 , q
B
0
´
for I = A,B. It turned out that only nonparametric
restrictions (i.e., conditions based on revealed preferences, see, e.g., Varian, 1982)
could be derived with such preferences.
Restrictions of this collective labour supply model have been tested by Fortin
and Lacroix (1997). While the restrictions of the unitary model (Slutsky sym-
metry and income pooling hypothesis) were strongly rejected, the implications
of the collective model could not be rejected for a sample of households without
pre-school children.
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3.3. Consumption behaviour without price variation
In the former paragraphs, we concentrated on collective labour supply models in a
cross-section context. There it was assumed that only labour supply information
was captured by a given dataset. Consequently, information on consumption
was restricted to the consumption of a Hicksian aggregate commodity. Now we
will turn the tables. In many household budget surveys, detailed information
is available on households’ allocations of expenditures to different commodities.
However, individual wages and labour supply are lacking in many cases.
The set-up of the current collective household model will therefore be as fol-
lows. Firstly, we will assume that labour supply is fixed. In other words, both
household members work a fixed amount of hours (that may be zero), thus gener-
ating an exogenous income. This labour income may be augmented by individual
and household nonlabour incomes. Secondly, as is usual in many household bud-
get surveys, no relative price variation is observable. A third assumption is that
individual preferences over consumption goods are of the egoistic or caring type.
This again allows to make use of the sharing rule result to derive testable implica-
tions of this collective model and to provide some identification results. Fourthly,
we will assume that there is at least one commodity of which individual demands
are observable. Clothing would be a good example if one of the household mem-
bers only wore men’s clothing, while the other only women’s clothing. Note that
this commodity plays the same role in the current model as individual labour
supplies in the collective labour supply models. Finally, it is assumed that there
is at least one distribution factor observable.
These assumptions can be translated in a new maximization problem, which
results in a Pareto efficient allocation of expenditures on private goods to individ-
ual demands. The general model (2.5) is now reduced to the following problem:
max
qA,qB
µ (x, z) vA
³
qA
´
+ [1− µ (x, z)] vB
³
qB
´
, (3.6)
subject to
ι0
³
qA + qB
´
≤ x,
where qI =
³
qI1, ..., q
I
n
´0
, for I = A,B, is individual I’s consumption vector, ι
is a vector that contains a column of 1’s, z is an observed distribution factor
and x are total household expenditures. Note that, without losing generality, all
commodity prices are set equal to one. Also note that the individuals’ bargaining
weights µ and (1− µ) will in general depend on x, as the exogenous variable of the
above maximization problem. Let us now assume that the individual demands for
commodity 1, qA1 and q
B
1 , are observable. The maximization problem then results
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in the following set of n+ 1 observable Engel curves:
qA1 = g
A
1 (x, z) , (3.7)
qB1 = g
B
1 (x, z) ,eq = eg (x, z) ,
where eq= ³qA2 + qB2 , ..., qAn + qBn ´0 is the observed household demand on the con-
sumption goods of which individual consumption cannot be distinguished. The
equations of interest are those associated with qA1 and q
B
1 . Since individual pref-
erences are assumed to be of the egoistic or caring type, we can again make use of
the sharing rule result (see Bourguignon et alii, 1993 and Browning et alii, 1994).
Denoting φ (x, z) and x− φ (x, z) as the respective shares in total household ex-
penditures of individuals A and B, we can rewrite the Engel curves of observable
individual consumption of commodity 1 as follows:
qA1 = f
A
1 (φ (x, z)) , (3.8)
qB1 = f
B
1 (x− φ (x, z)) .
Via the four partial derivatives of these equations, a set of two marginal rates of
substitution of φ can be derived. By means of these marginal rates of substitution,
the partial derivatives of the sharing rule can be obtained. This set of partial
differential equations is integrable to the twice continuously differentiable sharing
rule φ if the cross-equation restriction ∂
2φ
∂x∂z =
∂2φ
∂z∂x is satisfied, which is a testable
restriction of the collective model.
In line with the results outlined in the former paragraph, this model allows for
some identification results if the restrictions, implied by the collective approach,
are satisfied. Firstly, the sharing rule can be identified up to an additive con-
stant. Secondly, following the sharing rule identification, the individual shares
in expenditures on private commodities are identifiable up to the same additive
constant.
Browning et alii (1994) applied the above model to Canadian household budget
data. Clothing was chosen as the commodity for which individual consumption
(in this case men’s and women’s clothing) is observable. They could not reject
the restrictions of the collective household model. Differences in ages and incomes
of both household members, and total household expenditures had a highly sig-
nificant impact on the sharing rule. Further results on the collective approach
to household behaviour in a cross-section context can be found in Bourguignon,
Browning and Chiappori (1994) and Dauphin and Fortin (2001).
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3.4. Other applications of the collective approach
The above contributions to the collective approach, as defined by Chiappori (1988a),
were primarily focused on the derivation of testable implications and identifica-
tion results. The collective approach is gradually getting more and more refined.
Moreover, many microeconomic models, based on the unitary approach, are trans-
lated in terms of collective household models. In this paragraph, a few examples
are given of these refinements and new research tracks.
The analysis of household labour supply has been very rudimentary thus far.
We assumed that wages were observable and fixed for both household members,
which gave rise to simple linear budget constraints. In Blundell et alii (2001), a
more realistic collective labour supply model is developed. It allows both nonpar-
ticipation and unobserved preference heterogeneity, which is common nowadays
in unitary labour supply models (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Concretely,
Blundell et alii (2001) consider the possibility of corner solutions in female em-
ployment and a discrete choice framework (working versus not working) for men
with no variability in labour supply. Firstly, under the assumption of egoistic or
caring preferences and some regularity conditions, they show that this collective
household model leads to testable implications on observed household behaviour.
In addition, individual preferences and the sharing rule can be recovered up to
an additive constant. Secondly, they generalize the model in order to take ac-
count of preference heterogeneity and unobserved wages for nonparticipants in
the labour market. For the case of linear labour supply functions and sharing
rules, further identification results are derived. The model was applied to the UK
Family Expenditure Survey, with a focus on married couples without children.
The restrictions of the collective household model could not be rejected on the
base of their results. In Donni (forthcoming), the collective labour supply model is
extended with nonparticipation and nonlinear budget constraints (e.g., due to in-
come taxation). Donni (2001) gives a collective labour supply model that allows
for rationing. For both generalizations, testable implications and identification
results are derived.
The household production theory provides an important reinterpretation of
household behaviour. This approach assumes that households derive welfare
from certain nonmarket goods that are produced within the household by means
of goods bought in the market and leisure time (see, e.g., Deaton and Muell-
bauer, 1980). Apps and Rees (1996, 1997) make a plea for the introduction of
household production in the collective approach, since its absence is not entirely
innocuous if welfare issues are considered. In the models discussed above, all time
not spent in labour supply is interpreted as leisure. However, it may be the case
that some of this leisure time is an input in the household production process of
nonmarket goods. In Chiappori (1997), some identification results are derived for
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a collective household model that allows for household production. If the domes-
tically produced commodity is marketable and preferences are egoistic or caring,
then the collective approach implies some testable conditions on observed labour
supply behaviour. In this set-up, the sharing rule can be identified up to an
additive constant. In the case of a nonmarketable domestically produced good,
more assumptions on the intrahousehold decision process are needed to identify
the sharing rule.
In Bourguignon (1999), the collective consumption model of Browning et
alii (1994) is extended to the case where children are considered as a public con-
sumption good to the adult household members. This approach exploits certain
ways of estimating the cost of children (see, e.g., Van Praag and Warnaar, 1997).
If preferences are of the caring type, then the sharing rule can be identified up
to a constant. Consequently, this allows for an analysis of how individual budgets
(including what is spent on children) change if the household budget constraint
changes. Contrary to other methods for estimating the cost of children, identifi-
cation does not rely on the comparison of consumption behaviour across different
demographic groups of households. The other side of the coin, however, is that
the sharing rule is only identified up to a constant. This implies that the actual
allocation of the household budget to the individual members cannot be recovered
without additional assumptions.
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) link the collective household model to the litera-
ture on consumption smoothing and risk-sharing. This literature mainly focuses
on the ability of the household to smooth consumption over time. In Dercon
and Krishnan (2000), Ethiopian panel data are used to test whether individual
household members keep consumption smooth over time. Apart from that, they
investigate whether households do engage in risk-sharing. They show that, under
uncertainty, the assumption of Pareto efficiency of household allocations requires
income shock pooling. This implies that specific income shocks to individuals in
the household are insured by the other members of the household. More specifi-
cally, if the household is a risk-sharing institution, then individual specific shocks
should only have an effect on the household’s allocation of consumption via the
household budget constraint. A test of the collective household model under un-
certainty then consists of testing for risk-sharing. Perhaps dissonant from earlier
results in this text, Dercon and Krishnan (2000) rejected the risk sharing assump-
tion. This, in turn, implies the absence of Pareto efficient household allocations.
4. Introducing extra bargaining axioms
Hitherto, we assumed only Pareto efficiency of intrahousehold allocations in the
different collective household models. The boundary of the utility possibility
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set, however, contains an infinity of Pareto efficient allocations (cf. equation
(2.4)). If one is ready to adopt some more axioms, besides Pareto efficiency, more
specific results on household behaviour can be obtained. This is exactly what has
been done in early contributions to the approach of multiple decision-makers in
a household. Manser and Brown (1980), e.g., derived empirical implications on
demand for axiomatic bargaining solutions like the dictatorial, the Nash and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky rules. McElroy and Horney (1981) proceeded with the Nash
solution and derived a generalization of Slutsky symmetry.
The Nash solution, e.g., is obtained if the axiom of Pareto efficiency is sup-
plemented by three other axioms: symmetry, independence of utility origins and
units, and contraction independence (see Thomson, 1994). The axiom of symme-
try implies that if household members are identical, then the gains from cooper-
ation are divided equally. Independence of utility origins and units requires that
the axiomatic bargaining solution is invariant to positive affine transformations
of the utilities of the household members. More specifically, although the Nash
solution is driven by cardinal information, there is no need for interpersonal com-
parability of utilities. Finally, the axiom of contraction independence implies that
if an allocation is the bargaining outcome for a given utility possibility set, then
this allocation remains the bargaining outcome for a contracted utility possibility
set that still includes this original allocation. Consequently, household behaviour
that satisfies these axioms is derived from the following maximization problem (in
the notation of equation (2.5)):
max
qA,qB ,qA0 ,q
B
0 ,Q
h
vA
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
− evAi hvB ³qA,qB, qA0 , qB0 ,Q´− evBi (4.1)
subject to
p0q+ wAqA0 + w
BqB0 ≤ yS +
³
wA + wB
´
T,
where evI (I = A,B) is individual I’s threat point or disagreement point. This is
the outcome that results if no collective agreement is reached. The Nash solution
is thus the outcome that maximizes the product of the gains to cooperation under
the household budget constraint.
A few remarks need discussing. Firstly, in order to be able to apply Nash
bargaining (or several other bargaining rules), the threat points have to be prop-
erly defined. The problem is that it is not very clear which disagreement points
should be chosen. Are the utility levels associated with non-cooperative household
behaviour appropriate, or should one choose the utility levels when divorced (liv-
ing alone)? The first approach was followed by, e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1993),
Konrad and Lommerud (2000), and Chen and Woolley (2001), while the second is
advocated by McElroy (1990). Even if one agrees on which threat points are to be
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chosen, not all problems have been solved. McElroy (1990) and McElroy and Hor-
ney (1990), propose to estimate the threat points by means of consumption and
labour supply data on individuals who are divorced. Consumption and labour
supply data on multi-person households is then to be completed with the esti-
mated threat points. However, this approach requires the independent estimation
of both preferences of individuals living alone and preferences of individuals living
in a multi-person household. Since the Nash bargaining solution requires a cardi-
nal representation of preferences, estimation of the above model from independent
data appears impossible (Chiappori, 1988b, 1991).
A second remark on the use of a particular bargaining rule is the following. As
shown by McElroy and Horney (1981), household behaviour that is assumed to
be the result of Nash bargaining, should satisfy some theoretical restrictions. If
these are empirically rejected, however, it is impossible to attribute this failure to
the collective setting as such or to the particular bargaining concept chosen (see
Chiappori, 1988a). Therefore, Chiappori (1988a) pleads in favour of a minimum
of assumptions on the intrahousehold decision process. Since most bargaining
solutions lead to a Pareto efficient outcome, the axiom of Pareto efficiency can
be defended as the (sole) starting-point of an analysis of intrahousehold decision-
making. This is exactly what is done in the models described in the former
sections. Moreover, if only the total household consumption bundle q = qA +
qB +Q (or alternatively, total consumption on a Hicksian aggregate commodity)
is observable, then the Nash bargaining rule is unable to empirically identify the
whole intrahousehold allocation process. Note that this is the case even if the
threat points can be adequately estimated and preferences are egoistic or caring.
The question remains as to whether the assumption of Nash bargaining fleshes
out the collective approach in this context.
To conclude the section, it is useful to stress the importance of the fundamen-
tal insight made explicit in bargaining rules. In a simple unitary model, prices and
income are the only explanatory variables. The bargaining approach now extends
the set of explanatory variables in a very useful way. Every variable that can be
expected to affect the threat points of the individuals can be taken up in the anal-
ysis. This idea is captured by the concept of distribution factors in the collective
household model (cf. supra). These variables also affect the bargaining power of
individuals, which has consequences on the chosen Pareto efficient allocation.
5. A browse through some non-cooperative household mod-
els
One class of household models that explicitly takes account of multiple decision-
makers, is based on non-cooperative game theory. In these non-cooperative mod-
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els, it is assumed that household members maximize their utility, subject to an
individual budget constraint and taking the other individual’s behaviour as given.
A distinguishing characteristic with respect to the models described above, is that
they do not necessarily result in Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocations. This
depends on the assumptions made with regard to how individuals in the household
are interdependent (e.g., via public goods).
Seminal papers on the non-cooperative approach are Leuthold (1968) and Ash-
worth and Ulph (1981). In these labour supply models, individuals allocate their
full income to own leisure and a Hicksian consumption good, which is assumed
to be a public good. The model of Ashworth and Ulph (1981) also allows for
external effects with regard to the other individual’s leisure. It can be shown
that both models imply other behavioural restrictions than the standard unitary
model. What is important for these models, is that they do not imply Pareto
efficient intrahousehold allocations (see, e.g., Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1990 and
Konrad and Lommerud, 1995).
This is also made clear in non-cooperative consumption models. Examples
are Chen and Woolley (2001) and Browning and Lechene (2001). Household
consumption behaviour is modelled here as a voluntary contributions game with
public goods. In other words, each household member allocates an individual
budget to private consumption and to a contribution for household public goods.
The contribution of the other individual is taken as given. In general, these mod-
els obtain inefficient intrahousehold allocations. All household members would
be better off if they would simultaneously increase their contribution for public
goods. This result parallels standard results in welfare economic models focusing
on the private provision of public goods (see, e.g., Myles, 1995). It is perhaps
interesting to note that other remarkable results of welfare economic models are
transferred to these non-cooperative consumption models. With regard to the
empirical testing of the income pooling hypothesis (cf. supra), it is important
that the intrahousehold income distribution does not always have an effect on
the allocation of consumption within the household. A similar result is obtained
in models that analyse the private provision of public goods in economies with
several households. The total provision of the public good can be shown to be
independent of the income distribution when certain conditions are satisfied (see,
e.g., Warr, 1983 and Bergstrom et alii, 1986). Another invariance result with re-
spect to the income distribution within the household occurs when preferences are
of the Beckerian caring type, with public goods as an argument in the subutility
functions (cf. supra). Here it can be shown that small income distributions at
the extremes of the intrahousehold income distribution do not have any effect on
the intrahousehold allocation. This result is a version of Becker’s (1974b) rotten
kid theorem. This states that if the high income household member cares enough
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about the other individual that transfers are made to the latter, then small re-
distributions of income do not affect the consumption of the household members
(see Bergstrom, 1989).
Although Pareto inefficient allocations are a characteristic of many non-cooperative
household models, this is not always the case. Browning (2000), for example,
analyses saving behaviour and portfolio choice of non-cooperative households.
Household members derive utility from the current and future consumption of a
household public good. The Nash equilibrium in this model can be shown to be
Pareto efficient. The reason for this result is that all consumption is public. As
soon as private consumption or leisure are taken up in the analysis, inefficient
outcomes once again become possible.
6. Conclusion: is the game worth the candle?
The collective approach to household behaviour seems to be a valuable alternative
to the unitary model. In the unitary model, it is assumed that households behave
as if they were single decision-making units. Contrary to this, the collective ap-
proach explicitly takes account of the fact that multi-person households consist
of several members who may have different preferences. An intrahousehold bar-
gaining process is assumed to take place among these household members. This
bargaining process can take many forms. The collective model, as defined by
Chiappori (1988a), only assumes that the bargaining within a household results
in Pareto efficient allocations of household resources.
The collective approach has some important advantages over the unitary model.
Since the former assigns individual preferences to the different household mem-
bers, it meets the principle of methodological individualism. Although this Pop-
perian principle is essentially normative in nature, it can be argued to be a fertile
starting point for social theories.
Perhaps more important than the compatibility with methodological individ-
ualism, is the fact that the collective approach does not subject observable house-
hold behaviour to the empirical strait-jacket of the unitary model. This does not
imply, however, that any observable household behaviour can be considered as
coming from a collective model. The assumption of Pareto efficiency of household
decisions engenders testable, and thus rejectable, restrictions on observed house-
hold allocations. These restrictions are weaker than the theoretical implications
of the unitary model, which is nested in the collective model. Since the same
behaviour is explained by means of fewer hypotheses, the principle of Ockham’s
razor would favour the collective model as opposed to the unitary one.
A third advantage of the collective approach is that it is able to say more on the
intrahousehold distribution of resources. This is entirely missing in the unitary
29
model, which can only provide the base for models focusing on interhousehold
inequality.
The collective approach comes at a cost, however. It is well-known that pref-
erences can be recovered by means of observable demand and labour supply, if
the latter satisfy the theoretical restrictions of the unitary model. This is an im-
portant result for welfare economic issues. In general, the collective approach
does not allow such a strong identification result for individual preferences and
the intrahousehold decision process. Nonetheless, a great deal of this process and
of individual preferences can be identified by means of a collective model and
some additional weak assumptions. This allows for an evaluation of the changes
in the household members’ shares of total resources coming from changes in the
economic environment. Relative shares of the initial situation, on the other hand,
cannot be identified.
It should be clear, however, that one must not throw out the baby with the
bath-water. It can be argued that an evaluation of policy reforms is primarily
interested in the change of a welfare measure, rather than in the welfare level
itself. The possibility of stating that a certain policy proposal will increase the
resources going to women or children in households by x dollar, or euro, provides
the collective approach with a comparative advantage that should not be under-
estimated. Therefore, it should be clear that the answer to the question in the
title of this section is unambiguously yes.
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Notes
1. This hypothesis may also find some support in the sociological literature on
money management in households. Pahl (1989), e.g., distinguishes between
four patterns of money management. One of these types is the so-called
‘whole wage system’, where one partner is responsible for almost all house-
hold expenditures. That partner, usually the wife, solely allocates the means
of the household, taking into account the needs of all household members.
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This system was widespread until the beginning of the twentieth century,
especially in the labour class.
2. Perhaps this can be viewed as a (small) concession to the “hardy souls
[who] will pursue the will-o’-the-wisp of sovereignty within the family so as
to reduce even these collective indifference curves to an individualistic basis”
(Samuelson, 1947, p. 224).
3. Rational preferences are defined as a preference ordering that is both com-
plete and transitive. Completeness says that the consumer has a well-defined
preference between any two bundles in the consumption and leisure set.
Transitivity (or consistency) excludes cyclical preferences in sequences of
pairwise choices between bundles.
4. Note that ∂g
∂ep0 denotes the matrix of effects on demand due to a marginal
change in the prices, with full income
³
yS + wAT + wBT
´
kept constant. Of
course, for price changes of the consumption goods q there is nothing new
under the sun. As regards marginal changes in the wage rates, however, one
should remember that this induces, apart from the usual price and income
effects, an additional income effect coming from a change in full income.
That is, ∂g∂wI =
∂g
∂wI |yS −T ∂g∂(yS+wAT+wBT ) , I = A,B.
5. To see this, note that the Lagrangian function of the maximization prob-
lem (2.4) equals: vA
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
+ δ
h
vB
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
− uB
i
+
λ
h
yS +
³
wA + wB
´
T − p0q− wAqA0 − wBqB0
i
. Multiplying this Lagrangian
function by 1
1+δ , results in µv
A
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
+(1− µ) vB
³
qA,qB, qA0 , q
B
0 ,Q
´
+
ρ
h
yS+
³
wA + wB
´
T − p0q− wAqA0 + wBqB0
i
where µ = 1
1+δ and ρ =
λ
1+δ
and where the unimportant constant uB for the maximization problem has
been eliminated.
6. Take, for example, the Stone-Geary utility function, which gives rise to the
linear expenditure system, in a consumption context (allocation of bud-
get x to commodities q, given prices p) and without referring to collective
household models. Let us assume that for one reason or another (e.g.,
presence of ‘snob’ or Veblen goods), prices and expenditures affect prefer-
ences as follows: u =
P
i (β0i + β1ipi + β1ix) ln (qi − γi), where the β’s and
the γ’s are parameters subject to the usual restrictions. Deriving demand
and the ‘Slutsky effects’ by means of observable demand will show that
sij =
∂gi
∂pj
+ ∂gi∂x qj 6= ∂gj∂pi +
∂gj
∂x qi = sji.
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7. Latent separability is a generalization of weak separability, which allows
some goods to enter in more than one commodity group.
8. E.g., it may be assumed that only relative nonlabour incomes affect the
bargaining power of the individuals. The single distribution factor z would
then equal y
A
yB
. Remark that this implies an extra effect on the function µ,
in comparison with the previous paragraph. There, a marginal change in,
say, yA only affected µ via the full household income: ∂µ∂yA =
∂µ
∂(yS+wAT+wBT ) .
Now we have ∂µ∂yA =
∂µ
∂(yS+wAT+wBT ) +
∂µ
∂yA |yS .
9. This is easily seen if one derives the first-order conditions and marginal sub-
stitution rates between commodities of this allocation problem and compares
them with those obtained from the maximization problem (2.5).
10. As regards the applicability of this result to caring preferences, it is perhaps
worthwhile to note that the externalities embodied in this kind of preferences
are Pareto irrelevant, in the sense that a competitive equilibrium remains
Pareto efficient in the presence of externalities (see Parks, 1991). Also note
that we did not take into account public consumption to state the alternative
interpretation of the collective household model. A comparable result can
be derived by means of individual utility functions with public consumption
as an argument. The first stage of the two-stage budgeting process then
amounts to the allocation of full income to expenditures on public goods and
to the individuals’ shares of full income. In the second stage, both household
members allocate their share to own consumption and leisure, conditionally
on public consumption (or unconditionally if public consumption is weakly
separable from private consumption).
11. Frequently, one implicitly appeals to Hicks’ composite commodity theorem,
if one applies the unitary model. As already mentioned, in many budget
surveys, one cannot distinguish the final consumer of, say, bread or soft
drinks. Since it can be assumed that both individuals buy these commodities
at the same prices, Hicksian aggregate commodities can be composed. A
new preference ordering can then be defined on these Hicksian aggregates
(in this case, household expenditures on the different commodities).
12. The same results can be obtained with caring preferences. To save on no-
tation, however, we have opted for an analysis under egoistic preferences.
Also note that we will not focus on public goods. This does not change the
main results.
13. Note that this is a slight generalization of the results of Chiappori, Fortin
and Lacroix (forthcoming), who assume that only total household nonlabour
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income yS is observable. We have opted for the generalization to keep nota-
tion as close as possible to that of previous results. In the next paragraph,
we will also assume that only yS is observed.
14. To give an example:
∂`A
∂wB
∂`A
∂yA
=
∂φ
∂wB
∂φ
∂yA
.
15. In the given set-up, with only two commodities as arguments in the individ-
ual utility functions and one of the prices set equal to one, a negative effect
of a compensated change in wI on leisure qI0 is all that is required.
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